Summary. In many existing markets demanders wish to buy more than one unit from a group of identical units of a commodity. Often, the units are sold simultaneously by auction. The vast majority of literature pertaining to the economics of auctions, however, considers environments in which demanders buy at most one object. In this paper we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a set of bidding strategies to be a symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium to a uniform price sealed bid auction using the "first rejected bid pricing rule" in an independent private values environment with two-unit demands. In any symmetric monotone BayesNash equilibrium, all bidders submit one bid equal to their higher valuation and one bid lower than their lower valuation. We characterize the equilibrium and derive the exact amount of underrevelation in the lower bid.
Introduction
Auctions are used in every part of the world to transact trillions of dollars worth of objects every year. The omnipresence of auctions has certainly not gone unnoticed by economists who have generated a huge literature on the subject. Most of the literature focuses on environments where a single seller has one or more indivisible object(s) to be sold to multiple bidders, each of whom wants to buy at most one of the objects. In the first major paper on the subject, Vickrey (1961) introduces the second price sealed bid auction and its multi-unit generalization, the uniform price sealed bid auction with "first rejected bid" pricing. In an environment in which each demander independently draws one valuation, known only to her, from a distribution which is known to all demanders, these auctions 338 c. Noussair are demand revealing. Each bidder has a dominant strategy to submit a bid equal to the value she has drawn.
In most markets where auctions are currently used, however, it is common for buyers to wish to buy more than one unit of the commodity. If a demander wishes to and is permitted to purchase more than one unit, non-uniform pricing is required to induce demand revelation (Vickrey (1961) , Forsythe and Isaac (1982), Weber (1983) ). 2 The demand revealing auctions are quite complex and in many applications the simplicity of a uniform pricing rule may be preferred or required. Assessing the consequences of using a uniform price auction and the resulting strategic behavior on the part of bidders requires an analysis of the equilibrium properties of the particular auction applied. Characterization of equilibria for a simple uniform price auction is thus the focus of this paper.
In the next section we model a uniform price sealed bid auction with "first rejected bid" pricing in an independent private values environment with two-unit demands. In theorem 1, we list necessary conditions for a bidding rule to be a symmetric undominated strictly monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium, each demander bids his valuation for his higher-valued unit and less than his valuation for his lower-valued unit. The exact amount of underrevelation is derived in lemma 2. The bidding function must be separable, in the sense that each bidder's lower bid is independent of his higher valuation and vice-versa. In theorem 2, sufficient conditions for a bidding function satisfying the conditions of theorem 1 to be an equilibrium are given.
The uniform price sealed bid auction
In this section we consider the theoretical properties of a simple uniform price sealed bid auction within a two-unit demand independent private values environment. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a bidding function to be a symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium are derived, and an example is provided.
The model
Let there be k (> 1) identical units to be sold and n + 1 (> 1) demanders indexed by i = 1 ..... n + 1. Each demander draws two valuations independently from a fixed and common distribution 7(v), where 7(v) has strictly positive density on [0, 6] c R + and 7(v)eC 2. Order the two values from higher to lower and index them 1 and 2 respectively, so that vii > v~ _> 0 are the valuations of demander i. Define G (vil, v~) = Prob(vl < vil, v2 <_ v~) , where vl and v2 are a pair of values independently drawn from 7(v). Let g (vl, v2) denote the probability density function of G. Since g is a joint density of order statistics drawn from a distribution with positive density on [0, 6], g(vl, v2) > 0 for all/)1,/32 such that 0 </)2 -</)1 "~ 6. All demanders are risk neutral.
Valuations are private information but 7, n and k are common knowledge.
1 Forsythe and Isaac (1982) show that the second price auction is the only demand revealing direct mechanism in the single-unit environment. 2 All of the demand revealing auctions are variations of Groves mechanisms.
